This paper applies that diagnostic principle to the reform of date-fixing for hearing applications in Ghana's Supreme Court. The question in the title — "What have we fixed?" — is posed not rhetorically, but analytically. The paper examines what the pre-reform system looked like, what the reform sought to achieve, whether it has achieved it, and what problems the reform itself has introduced.
A. The Pre-Reform Position
Before the introduction of the date-fixing reforms, the practice in the Supreme Court for hearing applications — motions for stay of execution, injunctions, leave to appeal, and other interlocutory applications — was characterised by lengthy delays between filing and hearing. An application filed today might not be heard for several months. This delay was not simply inconvenient; in many cases it was determinative, because the events the application sought to prevent or reverse had already occurred by the time the application was heard.
The causes of this delay were multiple. The Supreme Court has a heavy workload. Applications are numerous. The sitting schedule, while regular, does not accommodate the volume of matters seeking hearing. And the administrative systems for scheduling, notifications, and managing adjournments were not designed to prioritise expedition.
B. What the Reform Sought to Achieve
The date-fixing reform introduced in recent years sought to bring greater predictability and speed to the hearing of applications in the Supreme Court. The core idea was that applications, once filed, should be given a fixed date for hearing within a defined period, and that the court's schedule should be organised to honour those dates. Parties and their counsel would know when their matter would be heard and could prepare accordingly.
This is an entirely legitimate and important objective. Certainty about hearing dates reduces the cost and disruption of litigation. It allows parties to manage their affairs with greater confidence. And it contributes to public confidence in the court system as one that takes seriously its obligation to provide timely justice.
Before a cure can be proffered for a sick person, the nature of the ailment must be diagnosed. A remedy that does not address the actual cause of the disease may suppress the symptoms while the underlying condition persists — or may introduce new complications of its own.
C. What Has Been Achieved
There is no doubt that the reform has produced measurable improvements. Practitioners report that applications are now being heard within shorter timeframes than was previously the case. The practice of fixing specific dates, rather than placing matters in a general list to be called as time permits, has introduced a degree of predictability that was previously absent.
These improvements are genuine and should not be dismissed. They represent a real benefit to litigants and to the administration of justice. The question is not whether the reform has produced benefits, but whether those benefits have come at a cost that the reform's architects did not adequately assess.
D. What Has Not Been Fixed
Several problems that afflicted the pre-reform system persist. Applications may be given hearing dates, but those dates are sometimes adjourned at short notice or without adequate explanation. The volume of applications before the Supreme Court has not diminished; if anything, the improvement in hearing times may have encouraged an increase in applications. And the administrative capacity of the registry — the human and technological infrastructure that must support an effective date-fixing system — has not kept pace with the demands placed on it.
There is also the question of what happens after the date is fixed. An application that is heard promptly but decided slowly achieves only part of the objective. The reform's focus on fixing dates for hearing has not been matched by a corresponding focus on ensuring that decisions are delivered within a defined period after hearing.
E. New Problems Introduced
The reform has introduced complications of its own. The practice of fixing dates has created a new form of procedural dispute — about whether a particular application was properly fixed, whether the notice given to the other side was adequate, and whether the court's schedule has been correctly applied. These disputes consume time and resources that the reform was intended to save.
More fundamentally, the manner in which some of the date-fixing arrangements were introduced — by administrative directive rather than through the formal rule-making process — has created the constitutional vulnerability discussed in the companion paper on practice directions. An arrangement that rests on an administrative directive rather than a formal rule is an arrangement that any party can challenge when it becomes inconvenient.
F. The Diagnostic Conclusion
The reform has addressed a real problem but has not cured it. It has reduced some of the symptoms of delay without treating the underlying causes — inadequate resources, insufficient sitting time, and an administrative infrastructure that was not designed for the volume and complexity of the Supreme Court's workload. And in some respects it has introduced new complications that are the product of reform by administrative direction rather than by formal rule.
The cure, properly understood, requires investment in resources and a commitment to reform through constitutionally sound channels. The date-fixing reform is a beginning, not an end. What has been fixed is the symptom. The disease requires further treatment.